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The International Monetary Fund: Is it the
Right or Wrong Prescription for Korea?
BY ELLEN J. SHIN*
I. Introduction
In 1953, South Korea (Korea) emerged as a war torn county"
with one half-century of colonialism behind it. Since then, Korea has
become a major contender in the international market through
tremendous export-oriented growth. From 1995 to the beginning of
1997, Korea's economic growth averaged almost eight percent per
year Euphoria reached its height in late 1996 when then President
Kim Young Sam proudly declared that Korea had come of age as an
advanced economy with membership in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development,. an organization
comprised of top industrial nations.' In mid-1997, Korea's per-capita
* Member, Class of 1999. B.A., magna cum laude, University of California at
Los Angeles, 1996. The author would like to thank her family and friends for all
their love, support and, encouragement.
1. The Korean war started in 1950 and ended in 1953 with a division that
continues to this day between North and South Korea.
2. Korea was under Japanese annexation from 1910-1945. Japanese
colonization of Korea ended when the United States bombed Hiroshima in 1945.
3. Yung Chul Park, Investment Boom, Financial Bust: The Crisis in Korea,
BROOKINGS Rv., Summer 1998, at 14. Similarly, Korea's average real growth from
1987-1994 was over eight percent. See Against the Clock. South Korea Is Running out
of Time to Deregulate, ECONOnsT, June 3, 1995, at 17.
4. Kim Young Sam emerged as the fourteenth President of the Republic of
Korea in 1992. Incidentally, he won that election by defeating current President Kim
Dae Jung. See David Holley, Battle of the Kirns Unsettles South Korea, L.A. Tr. ES,
Jan. 24, 1996, at Al. All Korean names will be referred to in their traditional format
of family surname followed by their name.
5. For an overview of the OECD, see generally What is OECD? (visited Apr. 1.
1999) <http:llwv/v.oecd.orglaboutigeneralindex.htm>.
6. Bruce Cumings, Can tie New President Rein in the Conglomerates and
Establish a Lasting Peace with the North, 22 INTHESE TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, at 15.
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income exceeded $10,000 nationwide and $20,000 in the major cities.!
It was also the world's third-largest automobile exporter and one of
the largest steel producers and shipbuilders in the global arena.' As
the world's eleventh largest economy,9 Korea had achieved economic
success.
However, by the end of 1997 the nation's economic success story
quickly faded. The "Asian financial crisis"1" had spread to Korea.
Between November 19, 1997, when Korea first approached the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)11 for a bailout, and December 24,
1997, the Korean won fell more than fifty percent against the U.S.
dollar." The stock price index fell from 498 to 350, and thae short-term
market rate of interest increased to a forty percent annual rate."
How could this have happened? The answer appears to lie in the
undoing of a group of diversified, family-owned conglomerates,
termed chaebol,' which collapsed under billions of dollars in bank
loans in early 1997." Consequently, concerns arose regarding the
7. Craig P. Ehrlich & Jay K. Lee, Governance of Korea's Chaebols: Role in
Crisis, Coming Changes: How the Chaebols Got to This Point, Reform Measures (pt.
1), FOREIGN INVESTMENT, Mar. 15,1998, at 9.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. The crisis began in mid-1997 in Thailand, and by the end of the year had
spread from Thailand to Indonesia and Korea, as well as other Asian countries. The
crisis led to sharp declines in the currency, stock market, and other asset prices of a
number of Asian countries. See generally The IMF's Response to the Asian Crisis
(last modified Jan. 17,1999) <http:llwww.imf.org/Externallnp/exr/facts/asia.htm>.
11. The IMF is a cooperative institution comprised of 182 countries that consult
with one another to maintain a stable system of buying and selling their currencies,
enabling payments in foreign money to take place between countrie s smoothly and
without delay. See generally David D. Driscoll, What is the Interna'ional Monetary
Fund? (visited Mar. 4,1999) <http:llwww.imf.orglexternallpubs/ftlexrp/whathtm>
12. See Park, supra note 3.
13. See id.
14. A typical chaebol consists of dozens of cross-funded subsidiaries that make
diverse products such as ships, microchips, textiles, electronics, home appliances, car
manufacturing, shipbuilding, steel-making and petrochemicals. See Paul Shin, IMF
Bailout May Finally Tame South Korea's Giant Conglomerates, NEWS-TIMES (last
modified Dec. 4, 1997) <http://www.newstimes.com/archive97/dec0497/inf. htm>; see
also James Crotty & Gary Dymski, Can the Korean Labor Movement Defeat the
IMF?, DOLLARS & SENSE, Nov-Dec. 1998, at 3 (includes related article on the
Korean Confederation of Trade Unions' letter criticizing the IMF restructuring
programs).
15. See Timothy Lane et al., Preliminary Copy IMF-Supported Programs in
Indonesia, Korea and Thailand: A Preliminary Assessment, (International Monetary
Fund), Jan. 1999, at 13.
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soundness of chaebo'6 and Korean financial institutions." Faced with
difficulties from their short-term lending liabilities, Korean banks
sought help from the government Bank of Korea, which shifted
foreign exchange reserves to the banks' offshore branches and
announced it would guarantee foreign loans made to Korean banks."'
Critics accuse the IMF of being a doctor vith one prescription,
austerity, that it administers whatever the disease." Over the past
year, the IMF has been severely criticized about its role in Korea and
in the greater Asian financial crisis. :' In particular, the criticism stems
from the stringent conditionality requirements of the bailout package
put together by the IMFf*' In this respect, the traditional remedy
prescribed by the IMF of higher interest rates and government
surpluses, designed to reduce inflation and restore investor
confidence, is inappropriate for dealing with the economic problems
of Asia.n In the past, the IMF focused on countries with high foreign
debts, wasteful government spending habits, and loose monetary
policies (i.e. Argentina, Bulgaria and Mexico). However, analysts
agree that the Asian countries had relatively prudent fiscal and
monetary policies when the crisis hit, and that problems arose mainly
from the financial and corporate sectors.4
This Note begins by looking at some of the underlying problems
that led to the collapse of the Korean economy at the end of 1997. In
particular, it will address the lack of governance of Korea's chaebol
and its predictable role in the recent crisis. It then discusses the
IMF's program for stability and solutions, focusing primarily on the
16. The concerns about the future viability of chaebol in the Korean economy
was illustrated and highlighted in a 1995 Economist article, See The Frankenstein
Economy. The Economic Miracle Has its Darker Sides, EcONOMIST, June 3, 1995, at
10 [hereinafter The Frankenstein Econony].
17. See Lane et al., supra note 15.
18. See id.
19. See Lester Thurow, Asian Crisis Put IMFto the Test, BosToN GLOBE, Jan. 27,
1998, available in 1998 WL9114356.
20. See generally Jeffrey Sachs, The IMF and the Asian Flu, AMERICA'
PROSPECt, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 16. For a further discussion of the Asian financial
crisis, see generally Stanley Fischer, The IMF and the Asian Crisis (last modified Mar.
20,1998) <http'Jhwv.imf.org/external/np! speeches1998032098.HTM>.
21. See id.
22. John J. Kim & Gregory Gerdes, International Institutions, 32 INT'L L,:. 575,
585 (1998).
23. See id.
24. See Lane et al.,supra note 15, at 116.
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conditionality requirementse for financial restructuring and other
structural reforms such as corporate governance. Additionally, the
law and policy of IMF conditionality will be questioned. Finally, this
Note addresses the question of whether an international bailout was
the correct prescription for the Korean financial crisis. While this
article will focus on the IMF's role26 in the Korean financial crisis, the
country's economic and political history will also be discussed as a
point of departure.
II. The Case of Korea
A. The Korean Financial Crisis"
Heavy investment, an improper financial opening and the
government's inability to get out of a mess it helped create all
contributed to the financial crisis in KoreaY
The first of a string of major corporate defaults in 1997 came
from Hanbo Steel29 ("Hanbo"), the nation's fourteenth largest
chaebol.Y An investigation into the collapse revealed ties between
politicians and the company.31 Two months later, in March 1997,
25. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27,
1945, art. V, § 3(a), 60 Stat. 1401, 1406. The term "conditionality" in the IMF's
Articles of Agreement refers to the policies the IMF expects a member State to
follow in order to use the IMF's general resources. See generally ERIK DENTERS,
LAW AND POLICY OF IMF CONDITIONALITY 95 (1996). Korea's conditionality
requirements for IMF funding are outlined in their agreement with the IMF. See
Republic of Korea IMF Stand-By Arrangement, Summary of the Economic Program
(last modified Dec. 5, 1997) <http://-vwv.imf.org/external/np/oth/korea.htm>
[hereinafter Summary of Economic Program].
26. The roles of the IMF are set out in article I of the Articles of Agreement,
which have remained essentially unchanged over the past fifty year;. They include
the following: promote international monetary cooperation, facilitate the expansion
and balanced growth of international trade, promote exchange stability, maintain
orderly exchange arrangements, prevent competitive depreciation, assist in
establishing the convertibility of currencies, make the general resources of the IMF
available to help members deal with maladjustments in their balance of payments and
help shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in balance of
payments. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra
note 25, at art 1, 60 Stat. at 1401-1402.
27. For an overview of the sequence of events leading to the Korean financial
crisis, see generally Lane et al., supra note 15, at 13-14.
28. See generally Park, supra note 3.
29. See Ehrlich & Lee, supra note 7.
30. See Park, supra note 3.
31. See id.
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Sammi Steel Co. (Sammi), a unit of another chaebol, Sammi Group,
defaulted on its loans.' By July 1997, Kia Group, Korea's eighth
largest chaebol, also collapsed?3  The domino effect of chaebol
collapses led to a lack of confidence in Korea's economy. This
became evident when Japanese banks, which extended short-term
loans to Korea's chaebol, further tightened credit in mid-1997. '
Altogether, eight of Korea's chaebol went bankrupt in 1997,
leaving domestic banks with a tremendous amount of bad debt.' At
the end of 1996, the thirty largest chaebol had an average debt-to-
equity ratio of more than four hundred percent, compared with
seventy percent in the United States.!' Moreover, the average debt-
to-equity ratio of these companies rose sharply to almost 520 percent
by the end of 1997.' Essentially, this presented a threat to Korea's
economic stability. With astronomical debt, the chaebol became
vulnerable to a slump in sales, which could rapidly render them
incapable of meeting their repayment schedules." As a result,
because chaebol debt was short-term, denominated in foreign
currency, supported by cross-payment guarantees and closely
intertwined with the government, chaebol were vulnerable to a
downturn in the international economy."
B. The Chaebol and Its Influence
Following a military coup in 1961, Park Chung Hee (Park) took
control of the Korean government."' At the time, Korea was among
the poorest countries in the world, with rising unemployment, falling
growth and dwindling U.S. aid." During his eighteen years of rule,
Park's regime implemented an ambitious economic agenda centered
32. See Korea Chronology, CHRISTIAN Sd. MONITOR, Dec. 22, 1997, at B7.
33. See id.
34. See Cumings, supra note 6.
35. Asia's Financial Crisis: Linked to Its Economic Miracle? (pt. 1), May 15, 19.
JEI REP., at 5.
36. See id.
37. See Ehrlich & Lee, supra note 7.
38. See The Frankenstein Economy, supra note 16.
39. See generally id.
40. Alan S. Gutterman, Japan and Korea: Contrasts and Comparisons in
Regulatory Policies of Cooperative Growth Economies, 8 INT'L TAx & Bt s. L..
Winter 1991, at 267, 278.
41. Sandra Sugawara, Can S. Korea Do Business Without Bribes? Nation Hopes
Reform of Old System Won't Stifle Growth, WASH. PosT, Oct. 6, 1996, at HI.
1999]
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upon export-oriented growth.42 Park's agenda included a series of
five-year plans focused on building the economy.43 Over the course of
such five-year plans, a tacit agreement evolved between the
government and chaebol.'
Companies like Hyundai and Samsung, which are now household
names, entered one new industry after another. For example, in the
1970s, the government ordered Daewoo, a chaebol specializing in
textiles, to enter the automotive industry.45 To comply, Daewoo had
to borrow an enormous amount.46 By the end of the decade,
Daewoo's debt-equity ratio was nine hundred percent (that of the
average U.S. manufacturer is under two hundred percent)." As part
of its quid pro quo exchange, chaebol such as Daewoo provided
political support for the party in office in the form of streams of cash
passing between industrialists and politicians.' This tacit agreement
benefited the chaebol because it made defaulting difficult.
Consequently, because the chaebol were always highly leveraged,
with very high debt-equity ratios, and usually lower profit rates than
smaller firms, they required periodic monetary injections into their
ever expanding operations.49
The governments that followed took office with a pledge to
dismantle the close government-chaebol relationship, but failed to
keep their promises.' The pervasiveness of corruption in Korean
politics escalated with the indictment of two former presidents, Chun
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. The government-chaebol relationship can be described as follows: the Korean
government would inform the chaebol about which industry it should enter, and
provide that company with the necessary money, usually at bargain interest rates.
The government would be involved in decisions on the direction, scope and
management of the company. The government would also protect tie chaebol from
foreign competition, and even "excessive" domestic competition. In addition, the
government helped keep labor costs low by using its intelligence agency to suppress
labor leaders. Chaebol were also assured of a government bailout should it become
necessary. As such, the chaebol expanded sometimes recklessly and with little
consideration of risk. Over time, the chaebol entered into just about every Korean
industry. See Sugawara, supra note 42.
45. See The Frankenstein Economy, supra note 16.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Shin, supra note 14.
49. See The Chaebol That Ate Korea, ECONOMIsT, Nov. 14, 1998, at 67.
50. See Shin, supra note 14.
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Doo Hwan (Chun) and Roh Tae Woo (Roh), for extensive bribery.'"
Besides criminal penalties, Chun and Roh were ordered to pay
forfeitures of the U.S. equivalent of $276 million and $350 million,
respectively, reflecting the fraud funds each was convicted of
amassing. In addition, the heads of nine chaebol were comicted of
bribery.' They received prison terms or suspended sentences."
Although former Korean president Kim Young Sam7' was not found
to be personally involved in any wrongdoing, many of his close aides,
and even his son, were convicted of taking bribes from businessmen.
The fears that chaebol have become so big and powerful that the
government can no longer control them are well-founded." For
example, at the beginning of the 1980s, the value added by Korea's
top ten chaebol came to twenty percent of the country's
manufacturing output; by the end of the decade, this share edged up
to twenty-three percent.5 ' Measured by sales, chaebol's power is even
greater; the top two, Hyundai and Samsung, together have sales
equivalent to a quarter of Korea's economy." As a result of the
financial crisis in Korea and the greater financial crisis in Asia,
President Kim Dae Jung acknowledged the pressing need to change
the pervasive and corrupt relationship between the government and
chaebol.' Indeed, he asserted that "'[t]his unfortunate development
51. See id.
52 See James Walsh, Deadly Reckoning: South Korea Visits a Historic Vengeance
on Two of Its Recent Presidents, TImE, Sept. 9, 1996, at 20.
53. See Sugawara, supra note 42.
54. See id. In addition to the dzaebol convicted of bribery, nine former senior
government officials were also sentenced to seven year prison terms for crimes such
as money laundering, bribe brokering and passing illicit payments to the two former
presidents. See Sonni Efron, 4 S. Korean Tycoons Get Prison in Bribery Case;
Corruption" The Sentences Shock the Business Community, Which Had Thou qht the
Men too Important to Jaik Many Predict Presidential Pardons, LA. TPlEs, Aug. 27,
1996, at Al.
55. As part of his campaign pledge, Kim Young Sam promised to root out
corruption. During his presidency, he pushed through laws requiring top officials to
publicly declare their assets and forbidding financial accounts from being listed under
false names. See id.
56. See id.
57. See The Frankenstein Economy, supra note 16.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See generally Kim Dae-Jung, Let Us Open a New Era: Overcoming National
Crisis and Taking a New Leap Forward (last modified Feb. 25, 1993)
<http:l/-vvw.kiep.go.kr/IMFIspeech.html> (inaugural Address by Kim Dae-Jung, the
fifteenth President of the Republic of Korea).
1999]
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would not have taken place if the political, economic and financial
leaders of this country were not tainted by a collusive link between
politics and business and by government-directed banking practices
and if the large business groups did not have a large number of
uncompetitive subsidiaries."61
HI. The IMF Stand-By Arrangement6'
A. The IMF's Program in Korea
Following the dramatic plunge of the Korean won on the foreign
exchange market in December 1997,63 Korea reached an agreement
with the IMF on a $57 billion stabilization package' that required
conditions on financial, corporate, labor, investment and other trade-
related structural reforms.65 The short-term objectives behind the
program include: building the conditions for an early return of
confidence to curb the unavoidable slowdown of gross domestic
product growth in 1998, followed by a potential recovery in 1999;
containing inflation at or below five percent; and building
international reserves to more than two months of imports by the end
of 1998.6 Shortly after its inception, however, the IMF program
depressed wages and created massive unemployment, plunging Korea
into a deep recession.67 The fifty percent devaluation of the won
61. See id.
62. See Summary of Economic Program, supra note 25.
63. The won depreciated over twenty percent against the U.S. dollar and Korea's
usable foreign exchange reserves shrunk to $6 billion dollars. See July '98 Turning
Point for Korea: IMF Report, KOREA TIMES, Jan. 21, 1999, available in 1999 WL
5589708.
64. Out of the $57 billion dollar loan package to Korea, the IMF contributed $21
billion. See New Illness, Same Old Medicine, ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 1997, at 65.
About $5.6 billion of the total was -made available immediately; another $3.6 billion
was made available December 18, 1997, following the first review of the
government's economic and financial program, and a further $2 billion was made
available January 8, 1998 following the second review. The remaining $9.6 billion will
be made available subject to Korea meeting performance targets and, in some cases,
further program reviews. See IMF Approves Three-Year Stand-By Credit to Support
Korea's Economic, Financial Program, IMF SURVEY, (International Monetary Fund,
Washington, D.C.), Dec. 15,1997, at 388 [hereinafter Three-Year Starid-By Credit].
65. See generally Summary of Economic Program, supra note 25. During loan
negotiations, the IMF seeks to negotiate an agreed upon economic program to
restore macroeconomic stability and lay the conditions for sustainable and equitable
growth, paying careful regard to the social costs of adjustment.
66. See Three-Year Stand-By Credit, supra note 64, at 389.
67. In its defense, the IMF asserted that the growth slowdown Korea experienced
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inevitably changed the livelihood of many Koreans overnight.
The IMF program seeks a comprehensive strategy to restructure
and recapitalize the financial sector and make it more transparent,
market-oriented, and better supervised through tighter monetary
posturing and significant fiscal adjustment:' The program includes
measures to reduce the high degree of reliance of corporations and
financial institutions on short-term debt and allows a better
diversification of risk in the economy."
However, the centerpiece of the IMF program contains a
comprehensive financial sector restructuring and strengthening to
make it sound, transparent, and more efficient." This is the central
focus behind the financial sector.7 1 The strategy comprises three
broad elements: a clear and firm exit policy, strong market and
supervisory discipline and increased discipline., The exit policy seeks
to ensure the rapid denouement of troubled financial institutions in a
manner that minimizes systemic distress and avoids moral hazard."
Troubled financial institutions will be closed or, if they are deemed
viable, restructured and/or recapitalized. ' For example, on December
2, 1997, the government suspended nine insolvent merchant banks."
In accordance wvith the IMF's program, these banks must submit
appropriate restructuring plans within 30 days which vill be assessed
by the IMF and, if not approved, the institution will have its license
revoked.76 These actions have helped to streamline companies and
make them more efficient.?7
To address strong market and supervisory discipline, the
program calls for a conversion to improved international practices
happened before the IMF entered the picture. In addition, without their assistance.
in all likelihood, there would have been an even greater recession. Sce Aim of Korea
Program Is to Stanch Immediate Crisis, Permit Return to Stability and Growth, IMF
SURVEY, (International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.), Dee. 15, 197, at 387.
68. See Three-Year Stand-By Credit, supra note 64.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72- See id.
73. See id.
74. See Summary qf Economic Program, supra note 25.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. The rationale is that companies will be more fiscally prudent about the
industries they decide to join.
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regarding banking, accounting, auditing and disclosure standards."
Large financial institutions will be required to have their financial
statements audited by internationally recognized firms." To lead the
financial sector restructuring effort, the government created Financial
Supervisory Committee in Korea, an autonomous restructuring
agency.'
As part of its reform package, the IMF program also contains
other structural measures, such as trade liberalization, capital account
liberalization, corporate governance and corporate structure, labor
market reform, and an information provision." For example, the
program breaks down Korea's banking system while creating
conditions that enable the speedy acquisition of the most profitable
industrial assets by foreign capital,' an idea unheard of a decade ago.
The program lifted the ceiling on individual foreign ownership to fifty
percent by the end of 1997 and to fifty-five percent by February
1998.' It also requires further trade liberalization as well as the
opening of the domestic bond market to foreign capital? 4 Under
legislation demanded by the IMF, the program permits one hundred
percent ownership by foreign merchant banks: "foreign financial
institutions will be allowed to purchase equity in domestic banks
without restriction."" To facilitate labor market reform in Korea, the
employment insurance system will be strengthened and private job
placement agencies and temporary employment agencies will be
allowed to operate.'
In a radical departure from its prior policyY Korea complied
78. See Summary of Economic Program, supra note 25.
79. See Three-Year Stand-By Credit, supra note 64.
80. See R. Carter Pate and Denise C. Andrews, The IMF Rescue: Asian
Economies Propose Turnaround Plans to Obtain Financing, 17 AMi. BANKR. INST. J.,
November 1998, available in 1998 ABI JNL LEXIS 217.
81. See Summary of Economic Program, supra note 25.
82. See supra note 67.
83. See id. at 390.
84. See id. at 387.
85. Until the recent economic crisis in Korea, foreigners conducting business in
Korea were limited by restrictive regulations, ambiguous business standards and
public hostility. See IMF-One Year After (5); Foreigners Support Direction of
Reforms, but Complain About Speed, Enforcement, KOREA HERALI:-, Nov. 29, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 20206307; See Summary of Economic Program, Yapra note 25.
86. See Three-Year Stand-By Credit, supra note 64.
87. Korea is traditionally very suspicious of foreign investment, This tradition
makes sense considering the fact that Korea is a small country between China and
Japan and has a long history of battling both countries to achieve its own
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with the IMF's conditional requirements by forging ahead with
reform, implementing new lawse3 and lifting restrictions on foreigners
doing business in the country.8 In its most recent letter of intent the
government stated that the first round of corporate sector
restructuring was completed in December 1998. The top five
chaebol and their creditor banks have formulated Capital Structure
Improvement Plans that focus on corporate workouts and the
exchange of affiliates between groups.-* Under the debt workout
framework established in conjunction with the World Bank,
important progress has been made in restructuring the top six to sixty-
four chaebol.? Additionally, tripartite discussions between
government, business and labor have enhanced labor market
flexibility.Y
B. How Does IMF Conditionality Work?
At any level, funds received from the IMF are conditional." The
conditionality of IMF loans is explained in part by the IMF's
obligation to ensure that its resources continue to be available to
other members." In addition, the criteria and conditions set forth by
the IMF bailout packages force member countries seeking financial
assistance to adopt stabilization programs to reduce the various
independence.
88. The Korean National Assembly enacted four new laws relating to foreign
investment and the Korean financial market. They are the Foreign Investment Act,
the Securities Investment Company Act, the Asset Securitization Act and the
Foreign Exchange Trading Act. See generally Laws Recently Enacted Relating to
Foreign Investment and Financial Markets, WORLD REP., Nov. 1, 1998, available in
WL 10487951.
89. See IMF Stand-By Credi4 Performance Targets, 19 E. ASIA-N EXECUTIVE REP.,
Sept. 15, 1997, at 18.
90. Letters of Intent are prepared by the member country. They describa the
policies and updates that a country intends to implement in the context of its request
for financial support from the IMF. See About Member Country Publications (visited
May 8,1999) <http://wvw.imf.org/externalfnpIloi/mempubaihtml>.
91. See Korea Letter of Intent and Memorandum on Economic Policies (last
modified March 10,1999) <http-Jvww.imf.orglexternal/npiloiI1999,'031099html>.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note
25, at art. V, §3, 60 Stat. at 1406; see also Dominique Carreau, Why Not Merge the
International Monetary Fund (lMF) with the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank), 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1989, 1996 (1994).
96. See Carreau, supra note 95, at 1997.
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internal and external imbalances at the root of their international
financial difficulties."" Member countries receiving IMF assistance are
thus placed in a position of international financial trusteeship."' In
many ways, the IMF operates much like a credit union," with
countries placing deposits in the Fund ("quotas"), which are then
available to loan to member countries who need to borrow and who
meet the necessary conditions. Member countries' quotas serve
various purposes. First, they form a pool of money that the IMF can
draw from to lend to member countries in financial difficulty.
"O
Second, they are the basis for determining how much the contributing
member can borrow from the IMF or receive from the IMF in
periodic allocations of special assets ("special drawing rights")."' The
more a member contributes, the more it can borrow in time of need."
Third, they determine the voting power of the member.' As such,
the size of a member country's quota typically reflects the size of its
economy and its role in the world economy."e For example, the
United States has more than 265,000 votes, or about eighteen percent
of the total votes;"5 Palau, which became a member in December
1997, has the smallest percent of total votes, 0.002."1
The rule of law is fundamental for determining the scope and
content of the conditionality requirements of the INF agreement
because the TMF and its members countries must conduct their
business within the framework of the treaty establishing the IMF.'1
This framework is laid out in the IMF's Articles of Agreement and in
the regulations derived from it.' Commercial bank and creditor
countries, on the other hand, are not bound by any formal regulations
and can refuse to grant credit at their own commercial or political
discretion." As an intergovernmental organization, each member
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Fischer, supra note 20.
100. See Driscoll, supra note 11.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Fischer, supra note 20.
105. See Carreau, supra note 95.
106. See Driscoll, supra note 11.
107. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fur d, supra note
25, at art. I- XX, 60 Stat. at 1401-1429.
108. See id.
109. See DENTERS, supra note 25, at 6.
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country can make an IMF claim because of its balance of payments or
its reserve position."1  However, according to article V, the IMF has
the right to block a request for IMF funds if adequate safeguards are
not present."' As such, conditionality is a consequence of the
requirement of adequate safeguards."2
C. The Underlying Tension
The interplay between the requirement of adequate safeguards
and the sovereignty of the member countries of the IMF inevitably
creates a tension between the two." Specifically, what is the scope of
the conditional requirements that the IMF can impose on a member
State?"' In particular, this feature of fund lending by the IMF raises
the larger question about whose interests' are actually served in a
country's IMF adjustment program. In Korea, the bailout (financed
by G7 governments,"' the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank) will not necessarily result in capital inflows into
Korea. 7 As discussed below, this is because the bailout to a large
extent serves the interests of the international banking community,
enabling U.S., European and Japanese banks."'
Korea's decision to accelerate the opening of its automobile and
financial sectors reflected pressures from major shareholders (Japan
110. See id.
111. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary, supra note 25.
112. See DENTERS, supra note 25, at 6.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See generally Devesh Kapur, The IMF A Cure or a Curse? International
Monetary Fund, FOREIGN POL'Y, June 22, 1998, at 114 (includes related articles on
the IMF and the World Bank).
116. The G7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom and the United States. The first G7 summit was held at Chateau de
Rambouillet, France on November 15-17, 1975. Its focus was to achieve a %%orkable
international monetary system. Since then, G7 summits have been held annually to
discuss major international issues and to respond effectively to potential threats to
the international system. The leaders also give direction to the international
community by setting priorities, forging common policies or establishing patterns of
cooperation on transnational challenges, and providing guidance to established
international organizations. See G7ISunznit of The Eight: History and Purpose Ilast
modified June 3, 1997)
<http:lwvwv.state.gov/wwwLssuesleconomicfsummitlf-_summit_historv.html>.
117. See Kapur, supra note 115.
118. See id.
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and the United States); "9 Korea's high tech and manufacturing
economy is also up for grabs. Presumably many Western
corporations will be able to go on a shopping spree, buying up
industrial assets at extremely low prices.12  For example, Taiwanese
businesses have made deals to acquire two five-star hotels in Korea at
bargain prices.121 The devaluation of the won has depressed the dollar
value of Korean assets facilitating such acquisitions.
In the context of the Asian financial crisis, international banking
and financial institutions, rather than the IMF, have come to play an
indirect role in the process of macro-economic reform. 2 Essentially
what has happened is that G7 governments have come to the rescue
of the merchant and commercial banks by agreeing to finance the
bailout. Yet, to undertake this objective, G7 national treasuries are
obliged to issue large amounts of public debt invariably underwritten
by large merchant banks. Thus, the beneficiaries of the bailout are
also the underwriters of the public debt operation required to finance
it.23 This creates an absurd situation: G7 governments are financing
their own indebtedness. In other words, it appears that these
institutions have dictated country-level foreign exchange policy. The
same Western and Japanese financial and banking institutions
(routinely involved in currency and stock market speculation) are the
creditors of Asia's central banks. 24  Thus, the same 'Western and
Japanese financial institutions that pressured G7 governments to
implement the bailout operations are also the ultimate beneficiaries.
D. What IMF Conditionality Will Do for Korea
The first and most important effect IMF conditionality will have
on Korea is financial liberalization."3 The IMF demanded a complete
119. See id.
120. In 1998, foreigners invested U.S. $9 billion, which was more than one-third of
the entire amount invested in the previous thirty-five years. See Sheryl WuDunn,
South Korea's Mood Sivings from Bleak to Bullish, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999, at 3.
121. See End of Year Look at Economic Crisis in Korea and What it Means for
Foreign Businesses, E. ASIAN ExECuTIvE REP., Oct. 15, 1997, at 17.
122. See Kim & Gerdes, supra note 22.
123. See Martin Khor, IMF: Bailing Out Countries or Foreign Banks? (visited
March 4, 1999) <http:/www.asienhaus.org/asiancrisis/imfasiakhor3.htin>.
124. See id.
125. Even before the Korean financial crisis started, then President, Kim Young
Sam, announced a policy of globalization (segyewha) in 1994. This policy was
designed to attract foreign investment by reducing government control. See generally
Ehrlich & Lee, supra note 7. For a further discussion of the actual liberalization
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liberalization of the financial sector,' making a higher degree of
transparency and foreign takeovers of Korean banks and other
financial intermediaries possible.' The second effect that I1F
conditionality will have on Korea centers around the problems of
market concentration and the chaebol's dominance of the Korean
market.' At its core, the hope is that the IMF stabilization package
will dismantle the chaebol, certainly a task that no former Korean
president has been able to do. The mechanisms provided for in the
IMF stand-by agreement" certainly make that a possibility. For
example, individual corporations in need of financial help -vill be
unable to take advantage of previous government subsidized support
or tax privileges.1: Additionally, to reduce the risk of a conglomerate
venture, measures will be worked out and implemented to change the
system of mutual guarantees.31 At this juncture, it is not easy to gauge
how successful any reorientation of the chaebol will be. However, the
concern lies with weaker firms like Sammi and Hanbo, the two
biggest failures of 1997, and more generally, an economy that is
grossly distorted by a small number of huge corporations."c
By far the most questionable effect IMF conditionality will have
on Korea relates to labor,"' and this is where the experience of earlier
IMF stabilizations is of little help. In reaction to violent
demonstrations against labor reform, Chun's administration created
measures implemented, see also Jane L. Lee, South Korea Liberalizes Foreign-
Exchange Rules, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1999, at C17.
126. See Summary of Economic Program, supra note 25.
127. See id.
128. Currently, the ten largest dzaebol account for approximately seventy percent
of the economy. See Cumings, supra note 6.
129. See Sununary of Economic Program supra note 25.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Also consider the fact that the chaebors economic success is the basic reason
for its economic catapult from the 1960s onward. To dismantle the chaebol
relationship, in the short-term, will inevitably bring its own share of negative effects.
133. As recently as December 1996, then President Kim Young Sam faced
considerable opposition from thousands of workers for enacting a new labor law
under pressure from the chaebol to lower labor costs and restore comparative export
advantage. The new law ensured that the Federation of Korean Trade Unions would
be the only legal labor organization in the country for five more years. In essence,
the law left out a group known as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions
("KCTU"), a group of about 500,000 members. This law allowed Korean companies
to lay off workers and replace them permanently. Because Korea has no
unemployment benefit or other government social safety net, thousands of workers
found the law especially threatening. See Cumings, supra note 6.
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laws designed to repress workers rights and unions.' Essentially,
these laws restrained independent collective action. 3 ' Unlike in the
past, Korean workers did not passively accept these policies.3" This
was because they were better educated, earned better wages, were
less dispensable and had more knowledge about workers' rights. As a
result, many labor groups spoke out in reaction to the government's
repressive policies, and despite the government's efforts at
suppression, industrial strife increased.137
Today, Korean labor is highly organized, with a ten-year record
of rapid mobilization."z The number of strikes and other incidents
after the Chun dictatorship collapsed in 198739 was the highest ever
recorded in the world, and today strong unions exist among all classes
of workers.' This makes the situation quite different from the early
1980s. A labor market with powerful organizations that provide
strong disincentives for layoffs means that the IMF must tread very
carefully with the Korean labor market reform. 4' If there is a
widespread perception that labor is bearing the brunt of stabilization
disproportionately, disputes can be expected to occur. If on the other
hand, Korean workers perceive that everyone is equally sharing the
burden, especially the chaebol, it is likely that the IMF stabilization
package can succeed. This appears to be the current situation. Since
1987, Korean labor has become sensitized to coalesce themselves with
the middle class if their demands are to be met. Thus, a fair and
broad sharing of austerity will encourage both middle class workers
and industrial workers to support genuine reforms.
134. See Jennifer L. Porges, The Development of Korean Labor Law and the
Impact of the American System, 12 COMP. LAB. L.J. 335,353 (1991).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 354.
138. See id.
139. In 1987, industrial workers, students and office workers in Seoul took to the
streets to demand democracy. Another demonstration would have ruined Korea's
opportunity to host the 1988 Olympics. Therefore, Chun decided to give in to the
public's demands for a democratic presidential election. See The Civilian Emperor:
South Korea's Remarkable Transition to Democracy Has Some Way to Go,
ECONOMIST, June 3, 1995, at 8.
140. Labor groups, such as the KCTU, oppose the restructuring imposed by the
IMF. See, e.g., Crotty & Dymski, supra note 14.
141. As part of its agreement with Korea, the IMF enforced massive lay-offs of
Korean workers. The IMF said its prescription would not cause widespread distress
if Korea enacted unemployment compensation laws. See Cumings, stpra note 6.
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IV. The IMF Prescription: Should International Bailouts Occur
at All?
On one side of the spectrum, the IMF prescription for Korea is
lauded by many scholars as necessary to prevent a much larger
financial meltdown.42  The theory is that, in an increasingly
interdependent global economy, a financial crisis in one country can
rapidly wreak financial chaos around the world.' In Korea's case.
without an emergency injection of U.S. dollars, companies in Korea
would default on their debts.'" This would cause distress elsewhere,
especially in Japan, where stagnation could turn into outright
depression. From there the crisis could spread to the United States,
Europe and the rest of the world, as banks fall, credit disappears,
stock markets crash and economies collapse. This is one theory as to
why some countries' governments supported the IMF's course of
action.' 4
In all likelihood, this scenario would not have taken place. At
most, a financial crisis would have slowed growth only moderately in
Europe and the United States. By itself, it would have posed no
danger to the integrity of the global financial system. Such a
recession would have occurred only if deeper financial trouble in
Korea caused Japanese banks to fold, if Japan's authorities failed to
contain that crisis in their own monetary system and if Western banks
failed to protect their banks. However, to say the global financial
meltdown was unlikely is not to say it was impossible. So one might
ask, why even risk this outcome, if it can be made much smaller at a
moderate cost, or at no cost? The Mexican bailout of 1995 ' is a good
comparison. Nobody feared a market meltdown in that case, though
there were concerns, justifiable in restrospect, about Latin American
contagion. Guided by other considerations, the United States and the
LMF nonetheless arranged support amounting to $40 billio it
142. See Fischer, supra note 20.
143. See Phillip J. Longman & Shaheena Ahman, The Bailout Blacklash: Hotv, to
Think About the IMF and Its Critics, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 2, 19 9,. at 37.
144. See Fischer, supra note 20.
145. See generally id.
146. The IMF organized a $40 billion financial package for Mexico on February 1,
1995. The package prevented a default and allowed Mexico to regain access to
financial markets, while limiting the impact of the crisis on other countries in the
region. See Barry Eichengreen, Bailing in the Private Sector: Burden Sharing in
International Financial Crisis Management, 23 SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFt. 57,
Winter-Spring 1999, at 1.
147. The leaders behind the IMF-Mexico bailout believed that once confidence
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worked, and confidence was restored. Mexico experienced a growth
in its exports that allowed the emergency loans to be serviced at
market rates and repaid. U.S. investors in Mexico did not lose out,
and in the end, U.S. taxpayers did not pay any money."
On the opposite side of this argument, however, is the hidden
cost of bailouts.'49  In a market-based system, the IMF safety net
dilutes the discipline of the market.5 ' This is because in a market-
based system of finance, the risk of losing your money is not an
avoidable nuisance but a fundamental requirement.' For instance, if
bank depositors are assured that their savings are safe no matter
what, they will exercise no care in choosing their bank. This problem
of "moral hazard"'52 is all too familiar to central bankers. To promote
safe lending in the long term, some risk must be left with depositors,
153
and far more with owners, but not so much as to make the system
vulnerable to short-term instability. A trade-off must be struck,
involving certain guarantees for depositors on the one hand and
regulation to curb excessive risk-taking by banks on the other.
In essence, there must be a balance between the two sides.
Striking the balance between short-term systemic instability and long-
term moral hazard is difficult enough for domestic regulators. It is
much more difficult for the IMF, who is only called in once the
damage is done. Unable to act as an ongoing supervisor of Asia's
financial systems, all it can do is demand reforms.
was lost, no investor would have an incentive to make additional foreign exchange
available. Thus, if Mexico did not receive the funds it desperately needed from the
IMF, they almost certainly would have been forced to suspend redemption of these
debts, inflicting significant losses on its creditors and risking damage to its
creditworthiness. See id.
148. Most Americans are under the misconception that the IMF imposes
significant costs on U.S. taxpayers. In reality, U.S. contributions to the IMF do not
add to federal spending. See Longman & Ahman, supra note 145.
149. Cf. "Bailing in" the private sector ensures that private investors will also take
their share of losses. See Eichengreen, supra note 148.
150. See About All Those Bailouts Now: U.S. Taxpayers Help Support the IMF. Do
They Get Their Money's Worth?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 8,.997, at 31.
151. See generally President's Testimony Broadcast; Lockheed Martin Moves to
Acquire Comsat; Former Citicorp CEO Walter Wriston Warns Aga!nst Reliance on
IMF (CNN Moneyline News Hour with Lou Dobbs, Sept. 21,1998).
152. In a nutshell, the term "moral hazard" is a term used to suggest that if one
makes a bad loan, somebody will bail him out. See generally President's Testimony
Broadcast; Lockheed Martin Moves to Acquire Comsat; Former Citicorp CEO Walter
Wriston Warns Against Reliance on IMF (CNN Moneyline News Hour with Lou
Dobbs, Sept. 21,1998).
153. This is the essence of a free-market based economy.
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V. Conclusion
In light of all the criticisms of the IMFs conditional
requirements, should the IMF have left Korea alone? Given the
small yet significant risk of systemic failure and the opportunity to
spare the Korean economy pain, it was right to intervene. To be sure,
the historical problems of the lack of governance of Korea's chaebol
and its seemingly unbreakable relationship with the government in
many ways led to the Korean financial crisis. Efforts to overcome
these historical problems were addressed by then President Kim
Young Sam's attempts at chaebol reform. Although these ideas may
have been helpful, they were certainly not the type of widespread
reform that the IMF program was able to achieve.
While the IMF's prescription may have been painful in the short-
term, it is almost certain that the IMF-led bailout and its conditional
requirements of the Korean economy may accomplish one thing no
past government could accomplish: dissolve the country's seemingly
indestructible chaebol. 4 Foreign companies in Korea looking for
medium- to long-term business can seek solace that in the long run,
the Korean economy will emerge stronger because of the changes
underway in accordance with the IMF program. Undeniably, it will
take time to reform three decades of the government-chaebol model.
Perhaps then, the Korean "miracle on the Han" will depend more on
efficiency and less on the multiplication of wealth.
154. See Shin, supra note 14.
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